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A Federal Tax
System
for the 1980s.
by WILLIAM L. RABT/ Senior Tax Partner

T

oo often the tax professional is
viewed as being engaged
//
merely"in trying to obtain
special tax benefits for his clientsfinding loopholes, seeking some
modicum of support for far-out tax
positions, acting as a taxpayer advocate
in tax controversies. Any such description displays a shallow understanding of
both the professional's role and how
the U.S. tax system works.
The tax system is complex and ever
changing, because legislators and
administrators alike have found it the
most responsive and efficient way of
fine-tuning the American economy, of
meeting the volatile needs and desires
of the American taxpayer/voter.
Therefore, before discussing the future
effectiveness of our tax system, I'd like
to discuss briefly the social significance
of the existing system and the CPAs role
in that system.
How vital is the role that the tax
practitioner plays in the system? Let us
use the example of a subsidy program
that the government sets up to stimulate the purchase of energy conserving
devices. Setting up such a subsidy
program would be a time-consuming

and administratively expensive task.
First, enabling legislation would have to
be passed. Then an appropriation
would be required. Either an existing
agency would have to staff-up to meet
the demands of this new program or a
new agency would need to be brought
into existence. Regulations would have
to be written and application forms and
procedures adopted. The first requests
for the subsidy money might take quite
some time to process. Perhaps two
years after the legislation was proposed,
an actual program might be in operation—by which time the energy
problem would have passed beyond
the point where that program would be
of any help.
Contrast this with using the tax
system to provide this subsidy either
through a deduction or a credit. The
minute a program was proposed, tax
people would start monitoring on
behalf of their clients. The enactment

of the proposal would result in almost
instantaneous communication to
affected clients about how they could
take advantage of it. Clients in
manufacturing or selling—of solar
panels, let's say—would quickly advertise the new subsidy. Marketing
programs would be operational based
upon the tax practitioners' interpretations of the new statute—and the first
installation actually generated would be
almost concurrent with legislative
enactment.
This is hardly the whole story of the
social role of the tax consultant. But it is
one part that is often overlooked. We,
not the IRS nor the Treasury, are the
element that makes viable the tax
system's role as a fine-tuner of the
economy. (The administration of the tax
system by the IRS is key to its continued
existence, of course. If voluntary
compliance in self-assessment drops
below some critical level, the whole
involved structure starts to disintegrate
—a point to which we shall return
briefly at the end of this article.)
The fine-tuning role is significant, of
course. It involves big dollars. The tax
expenditures budget is well over $250
billion currently and rising fast. Further,
these tax subsidies are not themselves subject to tax, nor do they
generally reduce other deductions.
Thus, compared to subsidies that are
taxable income or that reduce the basis
for depreciation, a dollar of tax benefit
is probably worth two. So we CPAs play
a vital role in running a $500 billion tax
subsidy program. And $500 billion is
vastly bigger than any other subsidy
program that the federaJ government
administers.
Given this context, and given the
repeated need that tax practitioners
have to examine the basics of our
federal tax system and explain it to
successive generations of entrepreneurs
and business executives, I believe CPAs
in tax practice are uniquely qualified to
speak out to the public and to Congress
on the fundamentals of how our federal
tax system operates. Herewith, then, are
some concerns that have been slowly
germinating in my mind.

What's Wrong With the Income Tax?
The present federal income tax can be
viewed as a ratchet mechanism. It is
relatively easy to increase tax benefits.
In fact, it is politically difficult to avoid
increases. For example, once alimony
was reclassified so that it could be
taken as a deduction in addition to the
taxpayer taking the standard deduction,
then charitable organizations started
clamoring for reclassification of charitable contributions so that they, too,
could be taken as a deduction in
addition to the standard deduction.
But the ability to use tax benefits to
manage the economy is limited,
because it is difficult, almost impossible,
to curtail tax benefits substantially once
they affect large numbers of taxpayers.
Deductions for mortgage interest and
real estate taxes act as tremendous
subsidies to the housing market. They
have been in the tax law for decades—
perhaps long before they even were
viewed as subsidies. No one consciously
determined that this aspect of the
federal tax system should be structured
to stimulate the conversion of apartment buildings to cooperatives or
condominiums in 1981—and yet the
current system contributed substantially
to that result, as demonstrated by the
shortage of rental apartments. The
system is simply not able to do anything
major about distortions of its purpose.
Any proposal now to completely
eliminate deductibility of mortgage
interest and real estate taxes probably
never would leave the House Ways and
Means Committee.
Attempts to limit and curtail benefits
are, in fact, a major cause of the tax
law's present complexity. The 1969 and
1976 tax reform acts, plus intervening
technical amendments, illustrate the
type of tax reform that our congressional tax leaders feel is politically
palatable. These acts do not withdraw
tax benefits so much as impose limits to
their use. The limits are drafted with
exquisite care, in order not to hurt large
numbers of taxpayers so much that they
will raise a ruckus. The 1981 act added
more of the same, and the 1982 act
continues the tradition.
Deductibility of interest paid, therefore, has not been directly challenged.
Instead, the 1969 Tax Reform Act initially

made excess investment interest
expense a tax preference. Since few
people were affected —and even fewer
understood it—interest as a tax preference slid in quite easily. The same act
automatically provided for a shift of
investment interest out of the tax
preference category at a later date.
Limits were then put on the tax benefit
derived from investment interest if it
exceeded investment income, including
long-term capital gains, by $25,000. The
limit was one-half the remainder. In
1976 the net investment interest that
triggered tax deduction limitations
shrank to $10,000—and long-term
capital gains were eliminated from the
definition of investment incdme. Thus,
most of the benefit of the interest
expense deduction was withdrawn bit
by bit from a handful of taxpayers.
(Ironically, the impact of the new limits
on deductibility of interest expense has
affected mainly the entrepreneurial
individual whose diasppearance from
the economic scene has led to great
lamentation.)
Some observers/legislators who have
been intimately involved in the
congressional tax-writing process in
recent years conclude from such
behavior that the federal income tax is
"burned out." It has lost its drive, its
creative potential, its flexibility — its
effectiveness in today's economy. They
even fear that it is becoming impossible
to administer the tax law.
But even if the diagnosis is correct
today, I think it extremely unwise to let
these conditions persist. If the nation is
to continue to control inflation and
improve its ability both to satisfy the
needs of its citizens and to compete
effectively in the world economy, we
need to do something to restore our tax
system to its former state of usefulness
as a fiscal tool.
Basic Tax Reform
William Simon, Charls M. Walker, and
the staff of the U.S. Treasury Department wrestled with the same problem

six years ago—albeit at a time when the
inflation situation seemed less unmanagable. The result, in January 1977, was a
230-page opus, Blueprints for Basic Tax
Reform (Government Printing Office).
Simon and the others cited the three
basic principles of equity, efficiency, and
simplicity as the cornerstone on which
to rejuvenate the income tax system.
Blueprints concluded that either of two
models was feasible, depending on the
degree to which taxation should foster
investment and inhibit consumption.
One model was essentially the
present federal income tax system, with
a number of specific modifications,
including:
• Integration of corporation and
individual income taxes, coupled with
elimination of the corporate income tax.
• Full taxation of capital gains after
allowing a step-up in basis for inflation
(and full deduction of capital losses).
• Taxation of municipal bond interest.
The other model emphasized
taxation of consumption and was based
on cash flow. "A consumption tax differs
from an income tax in excluding savings
from the tax base. In practical terms,
this means that net savings, as well as
gifts made, are subtracted from gross
receipts to compute the tax base.
Withdrawals from savings are included
in gross receipts to compute the tax
base." (Blueprints, P. 9).
While implementation of either
model would require a radical alteration
in our present income tax structure,
either could be a natural outgrowth and
a total replacement of what already
exists. The objection to either approach
might be that it has no constituency.
But taxation of oneself seldom does
attract enthusiastic support—at least
until compared to some alternative that
is even less attractive. We now face that
alternative. The U.S. may have to
choose radical tax change or else risk
disastrous and uncontrolled inflation.
The consumption model of Blueprints
would fight inflation by encouraging
investment rather than consumption,
and would do so without the direct

inflationary jolt that would result,
for instance, from the imposition of, or
increase in, a value-added tax.
A Touche Ross Proposal
If a basic tax reform, a la Blueprints, is
regarded as too revolutionary, perhaps
an evolutionary approach would be
more palatable-and thus more politically possible. The 1969 Tax Reform Act
spawned what is now called the
"add-on"minimum tax on tax preferences; while the Revenue Act of 1978
spawned the "alternative"minimum tax.
Both were attempts to tinker with the
income tax structure by offsetting the
more extreme results produced by
other tax provisions.
An alternative consumption tax
against inflation (ACT against inflation)
would take a similar approach, but
would tend to encourage investment
and discourage consumption. The
description that follows is intended as
an illustration only, since the basic
concept is quite flexible.
A separate schedule for the ACT tax
return , to be filed with Form 1040
showing gross income over $20,000,
would start with adjusted gross income.
To this would be added:
• The long-term capital gain
deduction.
• The tax basis of assets sold.
• Tax-free municipal bond income.
• Gifts and bequests received.
From the resulting total, which would
be ACT gross receipts, there would be
subtracted:
• Gifts made.
• Investment made.
A 25 percent tax would be imposed
on the resulting ACT net receipts.
Negative ACT net receipts, unless
caused by gifts made, would entitle one
to a 25 percent refund (or reduction in
the amount of income tax that otherwise would be due).
The effect of such an ACT would
be to impose a 25 percent tax on
consumption, if the amount exceeded
the regular income tax, or provide a 25
percent subsidy for any form of investment as a credit against the regular
income tax.
The U.S. income tax has evolved over
a 73-year history. It is now an accepted

part of our economy and is woven into
the framework of our institutions. The
suggestion of radical change always
creates rather justified protests that
established relationships will be disturbed and existing values destroyed.
We thus feel trapped within our own
history and within the framework of our
own institutions. But we can break this
mold if we wish.
The alternatives we face in tax reform
call for either a radical revamping and
purifying of the present federal income
tax system, a la William Simon's
Blueprints, or else more of the paper
clip and cellophane tape tax tinkering
that has characterized tax legislation
since 1964. The former does not seem
likely. Given the latter, I suggest that the
Alternative Consumption Tax (ACT)
might well be the approach to take.
That, in addition to the more liberal
capital cost recovery and marginal rate
reductions of the 1981 tax legislation,
plus more effective administration,
might give us the momentum to make
it through the eighties in better style
than the prognosticators of stagflation
would believe possible.
A Final Thought
More effective administration? Of
course. No tax bureaucracy can succeed
in administering the U.S. tax structure
unless it is given the funds and the
congressional support to get the job
done. Much of the present public
distrust of the federal income tax stems,
I am convinced, from congressional
unwillingness to provide the IRS with
the people, the money, and the legislation to adequately administer existing
law. The IRS should be able to get funds
if it can demonstrate that there is a net
"profit" to the Treasury on each added
dollar appropriated. While we have to
be sensitive to the dangers of IRS
overreaching, there may be even greater
dangers in turning IRS into a paper tiger,
or a long-shot losing number in "the
nation's tax lottery." For if the tax system
does not function effectively, then the
long-run substitute for what we have
had will be the capricious, pernicious,
destructive tax that is called inflation. £

